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Université de Lausanne
Faculté des HEC
Département d'économétrie et d'économie politique

Cahier de recherches économiques du DEEP No. 17.01

Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn


Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability

January 20, 2017

Abstract

We study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers.
We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the induced game. We prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all A-agents' preferences are substitutable. We also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the A-agents. In particular, implementation holds when A-agents' preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non-binding.

JEL Classification: C78, D78

Keywords: implemantation, matching, mechanisms, stability, substitutability

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