Aller à : contenu haut bas recherche
 
 
EN     FR
Vous êtes ici:   UNIL > HEC Inst. > HEC App. > SYLLABUS
 
 

Advanced Topics in Industrial Organization

  • Enseignant(s): M.Jametti , C.Neri
  • Titre en français: Organisation Industrielle avancée
  • Cours donné en: anglais
  • Crédits ECTS: 6 crédits
  • Horaire: Semestre de printemps 2016-2017, 4.0h. de cours (moyenne hebdomadaire)
  •  séances
  • site web du cours site web du cours
  • Formation concernée: Maîtrise universitaire ès Sciences en économie politique

 

Objectifs

Part 1: Jametti

The goal of the first part of the course is to make students familiar with nonstrategic

market behavior and the exercise of monopoly power.

Part 2: Neri

The purpose of the second part of the course is to make students familiar with

the basic models of strategic interaction in imperfectly competitive markets.

Contenus

Part 1: Jametti

The first part of the course will cover Part I of Jean Tirole’s book (chapters 1 to

4). We will follow the sequence of the book: monopoly behaviour, product

selection, price discrimination and vertical control. At the end of the course

regulation of monopolies will be discussed based on Laffont & Tirole (1993).

More details on readings will be announced in class. We will also discuss some

empirical papers which will be made available online.1. Monopoly

4

Main questions: How should a monopolist set its price? What is the

intertemporal pricing behavior of a durable-good monopolist? When should a

durable-good monopolist rent rather than sell its product?

Readings:

-Tirole, Ch. 1

1.1 Pricing Behavior

1.2 Durable Goods and Intertemporal Price Discrimination

1.2.1 Leasing versus Selling

1.2.2 The Coase Conjecture2. Product Selection, Quality and Optimal Number of Products

Main questions: What commodities should be produced and sold? Does a

monopolist have an incentive to choose the optimal products from the

perspective of a social planner?

Readings:

-Tirole, Ch. 2

2.1 The Notion of Product Space

2.2 Product Selection

2.2.1 Product Quality

2.2.2 Optimal Number of Products3. Price Discrimination

Main questions: What is price discrimination? What are the types of price

discrimination? What are the consequences of price discrimination?

Readings:

-Tirole, Ch. 3

3.1 Perfect (First-Degree) Price Discrimination

3.2 Multimarket (Third-Degree) Price Discrimination

3.3 Personal Arbitrage and Screening (Second-Degree Price Discrimination)4. Vertical Control

Main questions: What are the factors that create an incentive for a producer of a

final good to acquire vertical control of a supplier of an input when the market

for the input is noncompetitive? What are the factors that create an incentive for

a manufacturer to acquire vertical control of a retailer who can provide services

to make the final good more attractive to consumers?

Readings:

-Tirole, Ch. 4

4.1 Externalities and Vertical Control

5

4.2 Double Marginalization

4.3 Downstream Moral HazardPart 2: Neri

The second part of the course will cover Part II of Jean Tirole’s book (chapters 5

to 8). We will follow the sequence of the book: short-run oligopoly models,

dynamic price competition and tacit collusion, product differentiation, and

strategy and market structure. Before the start of the second part of the course

you should refresh your knowledge of Game Theory. The best way to do that is

to read chapter 11 (“Noncooperative Game Theory: A User’s Manual”) in

Theory of Industrial Organization

The.

Part II

5. Short-run Oligopoly Models

Main question: How do oligopolistic firms in an industry with a homogeneous

product interact in the short-run?

Readings:

- Tirole Ch. 5: Short-run Price Competition

- Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)

5.1 Introduction (April 13

5.1.1 Nash Equilibrium

5.1.2 Strategic Complements and Substitutes

5.1.3 Cournot Model

5.2 The Bertrand Paradox (April 13

5.2 Solutions to the Bertrand Paradox (April 13

5.2.1 Repeated Interaction

5.2.2 Product Differentiation

5.2.3 Private Information about Cost

5.2.4 Search Costs and Imperfect Information about Prices

5.2.5 Switching Costs

5.2.6 Capacity Constraints

5.3 Kreps and Scheinkman 1983 (April 27

th)th)th)th)

6. Dynamic Price Competition and Tacit Collusion

Main questions: How can firms sustain collusive outcomes? What are the

factors that influence collusion?

6

Readings:

- Tirole, Ch. 6: Dynamic Price Competition and Tacit Collusion

- Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)

- Green and Porter (1984)

6.1 Repeated Interaction (April 27

6.1.1 Finite T

6.1.2 Infinite T

6.2 Factors that facilitate collusion (April 27

6.3 Rotemberg and Saloner 1986 (May 4

6.4 Green and Porter 1984 (May 4

th)th)th)th)

7. Product Differentiation: Price Competition and Non-Price Competition

Main questions: How is the range of products available to consumers

determined under imperfect competition? What is the impact of product

differentiation on market structure? Why do firms advertise? How much should

firms spend on advertising?

Readings:

- Tirole Ch. 7: Product Differentiation: Price Competition and Non-Price

Competition

7.1 Horizontal Product Differentiation (May 4

7.2 Spatial Product Differentiation

7.2.1 Linear Model (May 4

7.2.2 Circular Model (May 11

7.2.3 Sequential Entry (May 11

7.3 Brand Proliferation and the Persistence of Monopoly (May 11

7.4 Advertising and Oligopoly (May 11

7.5 Vertical Product Differentiation (May 11

th)th)th)th)th)th)th)

8. Strategy and Market Structure

Main questions: What actions can firms take to prevent entry of new firms or to

force a competitor to exit a market? What actions can firms take to create

competitive advantages?

Readings:

- Tirole Ch. 8: Entry, Accommodation, and Exit

8.1 Introduction: Barriers to Entry (May 18

th)

8.2 Stackelberg’s Two Stage Game (May 18

th

)

8.3 Spence-Dixit Model (May 18

th

)

8.4 Business Strategies: A Taxonomy (May 18

th

)

8.4.1 Entry Deterrence

8.4.2 Entry Accommodation

8.4.3 Exit Inducement

8.5 Business Strategies: Applications (June 1

st)

8.5.1 Strategic Limitations of Capacity

8.5.2 Strategic Choice of Location

8.5.3 Strategic Managerial Compensation

Références

The Theory of Industrial Organization, Jean Tirole, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.

Industrial Organization: A Strategic Approach, Jeffrey Church and Roger Ware, Irwin/McGraw- Hill.

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, Massachusetts, The MIT Press.

Additional articles will be handed out during class.

Evaluation

1ère tentative

Examen:
Sans examen (cf. modalités)  
Evaluation:

Part 1: Jametti

Your grade on the first part of the course will be determined on the basis of

participation during lectures (10%) and take home problem set(s) (90%). There

will be three take home problem sets, two of them will be group work (60%) and

one individual work (30%).

Part 2: Neri

Your grade on the second part of the course will be determined on the basis of

participation during lectures (10%) and take home problem sets (90%). There

will be three take home problem sets, two of them will be group work (60%) and

one individual work (30%).

Final Grade

Your final grade at the course is 50% of your grade in part 1 and 50% of your

grade in part 2.

Rattrapage

Examen:
Ecrit 3h00 heures
Documentation:
Non autorisée
Calculatrice:
Autorisée avec restrictions
Evaluation:

If you fail the course you will have to take a final exam. The final exam is written and closed-book. The duration of the final exam is 3 hours. In case of a retake the retake exam determines 100% of your final grade.



[» page précédente]           [» liste des cours]
 
Recherche


Internef - CH-1015 Lausanne - Suisse  -   Tél. +41 21 692 33 00  -   Fax +41 21 692 33 05
Swiss University