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  • Enseignant(s):   C.Efferson  
  • Titre en français: Négociations
  • Cours donné en: anglais
  • Crédits ECTS: 6 crédits
  • Horaire: Semestre de printemps 2018-2019, 4.0h. de cours (moyenne hebdomadaire)
  •  séances
  • Formations concernées:
    Maîtrise universitaire ès Sciences en management, Orientation marketing

    Maîtrise universitaire ès Sciences en management, Orientation business analytics

    Maîtrise universitaire ès Sciences en management, Orientation comportement, économie et évolution

    Maîtrise universitaire ès Sciences en management, Orientation stratégie, organisation et leadership



The course has the following learning objectives.

1) Master a general theoretical framework for interpreting and analyzing both distributive and integrative negotiations.

2) Survey the empirical literature, from diverse disciplines, related to distributive and integrative strategies, cognitive biases that can distort the negotiation process, cross-cultural negotiations, and negotiations in crisis situations.

3) Participate in simulated negotiations in order to develop one's bargaining and negotiation skills in a controlled setting.

4) Synthesize and articulate key abstract principles to apply in a diversity of negotiation contexts.


The course will cover the following material in this order.

1) Fundamentals of interest-based negotiation, including interdependence, BATNAs, ZOPAs, and win-lose (distribution) vs. win-win (integration) negotiations.

2) Distribution as a coordination game. Distribution as a low-dimensional problem. The fundamental informational problem underlying distributive negotiation. Tactics for distributing. Hardball tactics.

3) Integration as a high-dimensional problem. The Pareto Frontier. Integration as a joint effort to solve a problem. Tactics for integrating. Trust and information sharing.

4) Distributive norms, shared cultural background, and focal points as solutions to the the equilibrium selection problem in distributive negotiations. Conflicting focal points and self-serving biases lead to impasse.

5) Anchors and other reference points in negotiations and renegotiations.

6) Repeated interactions and power asymmetries in negotiations.

7) Cognitive biases in negotiations.

8) Individual and cultural differences in negotiations.

9) Crisis situations.


Lewicki et al. (2015). Negotiation. 7th ed.

Fisher et al. (2011) Getting to Yes. Revised ed.

Raiffa. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation.

Malhotra and Bazerman. (2008). Negotiation Genius.

A variety of papers from the primary scientific literature in economics, psychology, and management.


Basic game theory and microeconomic theory, especially basic solution concepts in game theory and a firm understanding of concepts like asymmetric information and Pareto optimality. Some familiarity with social and cogntive psychology, as well as behavioral economics.


1ère tentative

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The final grade will have three components.

1) Participation in various negotiation exercises/simulations throughout the course (25%).

2) An in-class negotiation exercise and associated exam mid-way through the semester (25%).

3) A final exam (50%).


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