34 publications classées par:
type de publication
: Revue avec comité de lecture
Articles Breitinger D. & Bonardi J.P. (2016). Private politics daily: What makes firms the target of internet/media criticism? An empirical investigation of firm, industry, and institutional factors. Advances in Strategic Management, 34, 331-363. [doi] [pdf] [abstract]
Private politics refers to situations in which activists or NGOs try to push firms to conform to social standards (regarding, for instance, human rights and environmental protection) without public policy intervention. The existing literature on private politics has focused on large campaigns such as consumer boycotts, and looked at the impact of those boycotts on firms' financial performance and on the likelihood that firms comply with activist demands. Even though these large campaigns are important, focusing on them leads to neglecting the fact that a large portion of the time and resources that activists consecrate to private politics is used to monitor firms and criticize them through Internet posting and media statements, rather than to launch high profile campaigns. Little is known, however, about what drives these activists when they criticize companies, why they target certain companies and not others, and whether this criticism should be considered as a primary step in the production of full-fledged campaigns. In this paper, we fill this gap by exploring a unique international database of CSR-based criticisms against Fortune 500 companies for the 2006-2009 period. This database allows us to look at the impact of a broad range of factors including industry differences, country/institutional differences and firm-specific dimensions, on the likelihood that a certain firm will be targeted by activist critique. Results indicate that criticism is driven by strategic intents. Similar to previous literature, large and visible firms in certain industries are more targeted than others. In addition, these firms also tend to come from countries with strong institutions and high standards of living.
Bonardi Jean-Philippe & Urbiztondo Santiago (2013). Asset freezing, corporate political resources and the Tullock paradox. Business and Politics, 15(3), 275-293. [pdf] [abstract]
In 1967, Gordon Tullock asked why firms do not spend more on campaign¦contributions, despite the large rents that could be generated from political¦activities. We suggest in this paper that part of the puzzle could come from the¦fact that one important type of political activity has been neglected by the literature¦which focuses on campaign contributions or political connections. We call¦this neglected activity "asset freezing": situations in which firms delay lay-offs or¦invest in specific technologies to support local politicians' re-election objectives.¦In doing so, firms bear a potentially significant cost as they do not use a portion of¦their economic assets in the most efficient or productive way. The purpose of this¦paper is to provide a first theoretical exploration of this phenomenon. Building¦on the literature on corporate political resources, we argue that a firm's economic¦assets can be evaluated based on their degree of "political freezability," which¦depends on the flexibility of their use and on their value for policy-makers. We¦then develop a simple model in which financial contributions and freezing assets¦are alternative options for a firm willing to lawfully influence public policy-making,¦and derive some of our initial hypotheses more formally.
Urbiztondo Santiago, Bonardi Jean-Philippe & Quélin Bertrand (2013). International Expansion, Diversification and Regulated Firm Nonmarket Strategy. Managerial and Decision Economics, 34(6), 379-396. [pdf] [abstract]
Previous studies have shown that regulated firms diversify for reasons that are different than for unregulated firms. We explore some of these differences by providing a theoretical model that starts by considering the firm-regulator relationship as an incomplete information issue, in which a regulated incumbent has knowledge that the regulator does not have, but the firm cannot convey hard information about this knowledge. The incumbent faces both market and nonmarket competition from a new entrant. In that context, we show that when the firm faces tough nonmarket competition domestically, going abroad can create a mechanism that makes information transmission to the regulator more credible. International expansion can thus be a way to solve domestic nonmarket issues in addition to being a catalyst for growth.
Hadani M., Dahan N. & Bonardi J.-P. (2012). Corporate political activity and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis. Best Paper Proceedings Academy of Management, 1000-1012. [pdf] [abstract]
Using meta-analytic methods on a sample of 74 studies, we explore the links between CPA and public policy outcomes, and between CPA and firm outcomes. We find that CPA has at best a weak effect and that it appears to be better at maintaining public policy than changing them.
Kingley A., Vanden Bergh R. & Bonardi J.-P. (2012). Political market and regulatory uncertainty: Insights and implications for integrated strategy. Academy of Management Perspectives, 26(3), 52-67. [pdf] [abstract]
Managers can craft effective integrated strategy by properly assessing regulatory uncertainty. Leveraging the existing political markets literature, we predict regulatory uncertainty from the novel interaction of demand and supply side rivalries across a range of political markets. We argue for two primary drivers of regulatory uncertainty: ideology-motivated interests opposed to the firm and a lack of competition for power among political actors supplying public policy. We align three, previously disparate dimensions of nonmarket strategy - profile level, coalition breadth, and pivotal target - to levels of regulatory uncertainty. Through this framework, we demonstrate how and when firms employ different nonmarket strategies. To illustrate variation in nonmarket strategy across levels of regulatory uncertainty, we analyze several market entry decisions of foreign firms operating in the global telecommunications sector.
Bonardi Jean-Philippe (2011). Corporate political resources and the Resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Organization, 9(3), 247-255. [pdf]
Okhuysen G. & Bonardi J.-P. (2011). The challenges of building theory by combining lenses. Academy of Management Review, 36(1), 6-11. [abstract]
The article presents a discussion of foundational issues in the field of management science, focusing on advances in management theory and research. The metaphor of explanatory lenses is used as a rubric to illustrate the theoretical challenges involved in elucidating the interrelationships of various factors in organizational behavior. The importance of clarifying such interrelationships is emphasized, from the standpoint of editing scholarly papers on such topics for publication. Topics discussed include communication and psychology in management, economics, and behavioral finance.
Bonardi J.-P., Urbiztondo S. & Quélin B. (2009). The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities. International Journal of Management and Network Economics, 1(2), 232-256. [doi] [pdf]
Bonardi J.-P. (2008). The internal limits to firms' nonmarket activities. European Management Review, 5(3), 165-174. [pdf]
Bonardi J.-P., Holburn G. & VandenBergh R. (2006). Nonmarket Performance: Evidence from U.S. Electric Utilities. Academy of Management Journal, 49(6), 1209-1228. [pdf]
Bonardi J.-P., Hillman A. & Keim G. (2005). The Attractiveness of Political Markets: Implication for Firm Strategies. Academy of Management Review, 30(2), 397-413. [pdf]
Bonardi J.-P. & Keim G. (2005). Corporate Political Strategies for Widely Salient Issues. Academy of Management Review, 30(3), 555-576. [pdf]
Bonardi J.-P. (2004). Global and political strategies in deregulated industries: the asymmetric behaviors of former monopolies. Strategic Management Journal, 25(2), 101-120. [doi]
Bonardi J.-P. & Durand R. (2003). Managing Network Externalities in High Tech Markets. Academy of Management Executive (now: Academy of Management Perspectives), 17(4), 40-52.
Quelin B.V., Abdessemed T., Bonardi J.-P. & Durand R. (2001). Standardization of Network Technologies and Interfirm Cooperation. Journal of Economic Survey, 15(4), 565-591.
Bonardi J.-P. (1999). Market and Nonmarket Strategies of a Former Monopoly During Deregulation: the British Telecom Case. Business and Politics, 1(2), 203-232.
Etudes de cas Bonardi J.-P. & Frost T. (2006). Cheesed Off: Canada Pizza War in the Era of Free Trade. Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. & Frost T. (2006). Aluminium Foiled? The Alcan-Pechiney Merger. Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. & Frost T. (2005). Chiquita and the Banana Trade War. Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P., Frost T. & Holburn G. (2005). Bank of Nova Scotia and the Peso Crisis (+ Teaching Note). Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. & Holburn G. (2005). Tritortric. Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. (2004). The Future of the International Financial System. Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. (2004). Doman and the US-Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute (+ Teaching Note). Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P., Frost T. & Holburn G. (2004). Labelstock. Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. (2003). Movatis and the GM Food Activists (+Teaching Note). Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. (2002). Crisis in Japan (+ Teaching Note). Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. & Frost T. (2002). AIG and China's Accession to the WTO (+ Teaching Note). Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. (2001). Strategic Management and Deregulation: British Telecom (A and B) (+ Teaching Note). Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. (2001). Komia and the 3G Wireless Auction in Poland (+ Teaching Note). Ivey Business School Publishing.
Bonardi J.-P. & Keim G. (2001). Infosys in Germany (+ Teaching Note). Ivey Business School Publishing.
Parties de livre
Chapitre Bonardi J.-P. & Warin T. (2007). Open source software development, innovation, and coordination costs. Global business and economics anthology (Vol. 2, pp. 104-116). Worcester, MA: Business & Economics Society International, Worcester, MA, USA. [abstract]
Open source is often presented as a very promising governance structure for the development of software in the Internet world. One of its greatest advantages is that it enables and integrates the flow of innovation coming from many unrelated developers. We extend previous inquiries by showing that, due to information communication problems, this governance structure is in fact more efficient for the development of incremental innovations rather than radical innovations. Implications are drawn in terms of the future of the open source system, the economics of innovation and public policy.
Bonardi J.-P. (2002). Competition Policy in Europe: the Example of Merger Control. In Conklin D. (Ed.), Canadian Competition Policy: Preparing for the Future (pp. 114-118). Pearson Education Canada.
Actes de conférence (partie) Petty J.S. & Bonardi J.-P. (2012, Mars). Public Policy: Moving Beyond Firm Creation. Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation International Research and Policy Roundtable, Liverpool, UK.
Cahiers de recherche Urbiztondo S., Bonardi J.-P. & Quélin B. (2009). International expansion, diversification and regulated firms' nonmarket strategy (14436). University Library of Munich, Germany. [url] [abstract]
Previous studies have shown that regulated firms tend to diversify for different reasons than unregulated ones. This is the case for product but also for geographical diversification, i.e. international expansion. The logic generally advanced is that regulated firms tend to diversify when they face costly and difficult relationships with the regulatory authority in charge of their sector. This approach, however, does not explain (1) what is really at the core of the problem in regulated firms' relationships with regulators, (2) why these firms cannot overcome part of the problem by developing nonmarket strategies -lobbying, campaign contributions, etc.- to influence regulatory decisions, and (3) why they sometimes opt for international expansion rather than product diversification. In this paper, we propose a theoretical model that provides potential answers to these questions. We start by considering the firm-regulator relationship as an incomplete information problem, in which the firms know things that the regulator does not, but can cannot convey hard information about these things. In this setting, we show that when firms face tough nonmarket competition domestically, going abroad can create a mechanism that makes information transmission credible and therefore strengthen their position in their home market. International expansion, in consequence, can be a way to solve some of the problems that regulated firms face at home in addition to a way for these firms to grow their business abroad.